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THE END OF ENCLAVES: A REPLY TO BENSON
James K. A. Smith
In reply to Benson’s response, I agree that we should be seeking the dissolu-
tion of all enclaves in philosophy of religion—whether continental or ana-
lytic. But I continue to suggest that continental philosophy of religion bears 
special burdens in this respect.
I consider Bruce Ellis Benson to be an ally in the project of fostering a 
“healthy” continental philosophy of religion and so welcome his response. 
Indeed, given that many in the mainstream of philosophy of religion 
might be either skeptical or suspicious about the very project—seeing this 
exchange as an exercise in re-arranging the deck chairs on the S.S. Mickey 
Mouse—it’s important to emphasize that we share the conviction that 
philosophical sources emerging from the phenomenological and herme-
neutic traditions have much to contribute to philosophical reflection on 
faith. So I appreciate that he’s taken my “talking points” in the spirit they 
were offered: as conversation starters. Let me just briefly continue that 
conversation and then leave it for others to take up elsewhere. Without 
any pretention to being comprehensive, I’ll respond on just a few points.
A. First, regarding the importance of a “pluralist” philosophical forma-
tion: While I don’t think the ground for my concern was only autobio-
graphical, I’ll concede that my own philosophical formation is probably 
hovering in the background (though my doctoral work included training 
in “analytic” bioethics and early modern philosophy). And Benson is un-
doubtedly right to point out that many departments which are friendly 
to continental philosophy, including many at Catholic universities, also 
include solid resources in both analytic philosophy and the history of 
philosophy (Fordham, Georgetown, and Boston College immediately 
come to mind, for instance).1 So I agree there are rich opportunities for 
emerging scholars interested in continental philosophy of religion to pur-
sue graduate study in such pluralistic contexts, enabling them to become 
1And Benson is certainly correct to point out that many philosophy depart-
ments are monolithic in the direction of analytic orientation. I grant that there is 
no shortage of enclaves (and associated “jargons”) in American philosophy. I see 
some “thawing” on the analytic front in this regard, which is why I think it’s espe-
cially important that continental philosophers become bi-lingual in order to help 
erase such distinctions. Given the shape of “mainstream” philosophy in the North 
America, I suppose I think something of a burden is on us, as continental philoso-
phers, to find ways to participate in that mainstream conversation—though, as I 
note in my article, that is not license for assimilation. 
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“bi-lingual” in philosophy of religion.2 I think we’d both agree that ideally 
we’d simply like to see the growth and health of philosophy of religion 
(and Christian philosophy) as such, with the hope that we could forego 
the qualifiers “continental” or “analytic” in that respect—indeed, that 
such qualifiers would wither on the vine. Instead, we’d both hope that 
philosophy of religion could be pursued under a big tent which makes 
room for philosophers drawing on different toolboxes, so to speak: some 
have acquired helpful tools from Frege, Wittgenstein and Alvin Plantinga; 
others have acquired helpful tools from Husserl, Heidegger, and Jean-Luc 
Marion; and together, they can get quite a bit of work done.3 There are 
encouraging indications that the so-called analytic/continental divide is 
fading.4 And I think Christian philosophers should be especially invested 
in undoing this divide. This is why I think it’s so important that emerg-
ing Christian philosophers and philosophers of religion cultivate a sense 
of collaboration between analytic and continental schools of thought by 
receiving formation in both. Benson rightly notes that there are ample op-
portunities for that to happen.
However, that still leaves two related concerns: (1) Many contributors 
to continental philosophy of religion receive their graduate training, not 
in philosophy programs, but in divinity schools and religious studies 
departments where they concentrate on philosophy of religion. In these 
cases, there are not the same curricular guardrails, as it were, that will 
constrain emerging scholars to be formed in the history of philosophy 
and analytic methods. As such, there can sometimes be less of a check 
on narrow, “theory-driven” models of philosophy of religion. Granted, 
graduate students in religious studies departments can usually enroll 
in a couple of classes in the university’s philosophy department. But if 
a young scholar enrolls in a Kierkegaard seminar and one devoted to 
Jean-Luc Marion, then her philosophical courses have not provided the 
kind of breadth that Benson also values. This is not a principled argument 
against such programs; rather, it is an encouragement to young scholars 
who find themselves in such programs to value, as early as possible, the 
2Though I should note that young scholars are best served by pursuing training 
in broader fields which would then equip them for more narrow work in philoso-
phy of religion. In other words, philosophy of religion is often best pursued as an 
area of competence rather than an area of specialization.
3On this point, see William J. Wainwright, “Introduction” to The Oxford Hand-
book to Philosophy of Religion, ed. Wainwright (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005), pp. 9–10. 
4See, for instance, Samuel Wheeler, Deconstruction as Analytic Philosophy (Stan-
ford: Stanford University Press, 2000), as well as a special issue of Ratio in dialogue 
with Derrida, now published as Arguing with Derrida, ed. Simon Glendinning (Ox-
ford: Blackwell, 2001). Or consider the growing dialogue between phenomenology 
and the cognitive sciences (as seen in the journal Phenomenology and the Cogni-
tive Sciences). And closer to home, consider Deane-Peter Baker, Tayloring Reformed 
Epistemology: Charles Taylor, Alvin Plantinga, and the De Jure Challenge to Christian 
Belief (London: SCM Press, 2007), or the fact that Michael Rea would contribute 
to a volume like Belief and Metaphysics, ed. Conor Cunningham and Peter Candler 
(London: SCM Press, 2008). 
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historical and analytic resources available to them.5 (2) While Benson 
rightly extols programs where “the analytic/continental divide” simply 
doesn’t exist, I think we still need to emphasize why this is important. I’m 
not encouraging a pluralistic philosophical formation only to later retreat 
into a professional enclave. But if there’s such an abundance of pluralis-
tic, non-enclavish philosophical formation for continental scholars, why 
doesn’t the field reflect this?6 A skim of conference programs or the tables 
of contents of related books would not leave one with the impression that 
the field values such pluralism. My reason for encouraging broad philo-
sophical formation is so that the shape of the field might be characterized 
by the same pluralism.
B. A second point is more complicated: my critique of the proliferation 
of edited volumes and my encouragement to re-value the peer-reviewed 
journal article. This is complicated because of the nature of peer-review 
as blind and anonymous. In particular, I confess to being uncomfortable 
with the fact that Benson cites specific information about specific proj-
ects, and cites private correspondence with an editor of one of the most 
significant series in the field. I’m uncomfortable with this because it cre-
ates a situation of dissymmetry: the fact is, I, too, have been involved in 
these processes and projects (and others). But how could I cite my related 
correspondence and involvement without thereby compromising blind 
review? I suppose some of my reservations about these patterns and pro-
cesses stems from my “insider” involvement—and more specifically, from 
some experiences of frustration and surprise in such cases. But I think the 
integrity of the system does not permit me to cite specifics in the way that 
Benson (as an editor, rather than reviewer, in this case) does. So in lieu of 
that, let me respond more generally on a few points.
(1) To state what should be obvious, I don’t think that analytic philoso-
phy of religion is immune to the temptations of nepotism, nor do I think 
peer-review on the analytic side is any sort of ideal world. So my concern 
with continental philosophy of religion in this regard was not necessarily 
because of some quantitative amplification of the problem vis-à-vis the 
mainstream in the field. Rather, I was suggesting that continental philoso-
phy of religion, at this relatively early stage, might have the opportunity 
to resist wider trends—and has a vested interest in doing so.
(2) I concede that there is a very fine line between the small subset of 
a philosophical discipline that constitutes the relevant “experts” in a sub-
field and what I’ve been decrying as “enclaves.” One person’s enclave is 
another’s research group. Indeed, given the nature of professional exper-
tise, it is also very difficult to distinguish between expertise and friend-
ship—and here things get tricky. Insofar as continental philosophers of 
religion consider themselves an embattled group, this self-perception also 
5For instance, the graduate programs in religious studies at Syracuse and Vir-
ginia provide excellent opportunities to draw on strong philosophy programs—
even though the “philosophy” of religious studies at Syracuse and Virginia are 
very different.
6Again, my concern here about the shape of continental philosophy of religion 
does not entail some idyllic picture of analytic philosophy of religion, which I think 
can also be subject to criticism for its enclavish predilections.
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tends to foster patterns of defense vis-à-vis an “outside” and convivial al-
truism on the “inside.” In short, I confess that I find current conversations 
in continental philosophy of religion tend toward celebration rather than 
critique, adulation rather than criticism.7 And it has been my experience in 
the peer-review process that those who buck this trend tend to be margin-
alized as hostile or axe-grinding. Their reviews or evaluations are thereby 
de-valued, and sometimes replaced by a newly requested evaluation.
(3) This is why my concern with edited volumes is tied to my suggestion 
that continental philosophers of religion seek to publish in more “main-
stream” journals. Granted, given that philosophy of religion tends to be 
dominated by analytic discussions, this will require moving into foreign 
territory in a way; and continental philosophers of religion might expect 
some frustrations in this regard—that’s part of the experience of trying 
to become bi-lingual. However, journals such as Faith and Philosophy, In-
ternational Journal of Philosophy of Religion, and Religious Studies are not 
averse to publishing continental studies. And if continental philosophers 
of religion would submit their work to those venues, I can see several 
positive outcomes. Just by participating in these wider ventures, they will 
thereby be contributing to the erasure of enclavish boundaries. In addi-
tion, by submitting their research to a wider conversation, their work will 
(hopefully) be subject to critical review by sympathetic8 philosophers of 
religion outside of their narrow subfields. That should provide a welcome 
“outsider” perspective, generating new perspectives, insights, and lines of 
conversation. Finally, if the process goes well and work is published, the 
readers of such journals will be exposed to a wider range of philosophical 
reflection on religion—again, eroding the existing enclaves in the field.
C. Third, regarding the importance of “literature reviews”: I was not 
suggesting, of course, that every article should begin with a dissertation 
chapter. Rather, my concern was that articles in continental philosophy of 
religion make themselves responsible for situating their contribution to 
the field—and actually making some new contribution. What I decry as 
the “essay” form excuses the philosopher from such responsibility. While 
there might be no shortage of sources cited, including secondary litera-
ture, the “essay” form is free to operate as if others have not spoken on 
the same theme or issue or question. Perhaps what I should encourage is 
a sense of progress in continental philosophy of religion—a sense that this 
conversation is going somewhere: that we’ve been pursuing question Q; 
7Again, I don’t think analytic philosophy of religion is perfect on this score. 
However, I do think the analytic subfield does exhibit more room for internal cri-
tique. I take it that this is one of the luxuries of being the dominant “mainstream” 
configuration of the field.
8In order for such experiments to work, we need editors and referees who ex-
hibit certain virtues—who begin from a basic stance of charity with respect to 
continental philosophy and are willing to entertain that the tools of the phenom-
enological tradition have something to contribute to a wider conversation. It will 
also require editors and referees willing to be stretched out of their comfort zones 
with respect to methodology and terminology, and perhaps even willing to ac-
quire a certain minimal facility with these sources. On the other side, it requires 
continental authors who are willing and able to translate or paraphrase their work 
in ways accessible to a wider audience. 
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that Heidegger offered answer X; that Jean-Luc Marion quite definitively 
demonstrated the shortcomings of X and, instead, articulated Y; that I will 
point up the problems with Y and offer a re-tooled rendition of X as X’, 
etc. While continental sources might rightly have concerns about both 
“demonstration” and “progress,” I don’t think that precludes us from 
adopting conventional habits that constrain us to be accountable to rel-
evant advances in the field. While there’s plenty of room for “essays” that 
riff or wax eloquent on some (new) theme, what we need are more articles 
that are tight, careful contributions to the advancement of knowledge in 
the field.
Much more could be said. But in lieu of that, I’ll leave the reader to 
hopefully find prompts and suggestions in the interplay between my ar-
ticle and Benson’s response. At the end of the day, I think we’re both hop-
ing for the end of enclaves in the philosophy of religion. That will require 
a generation or two of formation, including the inculcation of virtues that 
value cross-disciplinary or cross-tradition dialogue. The goal is to form 
analytic philosophers primed enough by a curiosity in what the conti-
nental tradition has to offer to be open to learning a new language, and 
continental philosophers, willing to engage in translation work, who also 
find value in the tools of analytic philosophy. Such formation best starts at 
home; that is, I think such a vision of ending enclaves is best begun, not at 
the abstract, national level of societies and journals, but the more tangible 
level of our departments.
Indeed, many of my convictions and concerns in this respect stem from 
my being welcomed into the Philosophy Department at Calvin College. 
A historically “analytic” department with a long legacy in Christian phi-
losophy and philosophy of religion, I have most prized our Tuesday Col-
loquium—an almost forty year tradition of spending two hours together 
each week in order to read and (vigorously) criticize one another’s work. 
For me, Colloquium has been a rich philosophical education, making up 
for all those gaps in my own graduate formation. Whether reading Ste-
phen Wykstra on CORNEA,9 Kevin Corcoran on personal identity,10 or 
Del Ratzsch on philosophy of science11 (along with many more), I have 
had opportunities to be stretched into new philosophical fields and have 
found new ways into my own work, asking questions, say, of Derrida that 
I wouldn’t have otherwise. Conversely, unless my colleagues are shame-
less actors, I think some have also come to appreciate that a continental 
toolbox also offers helpful resources for philosophical reflection on faith. 
But that has been the fruit of patient conversation over time. If Benson and 
I are both looking for the end of enclaves in philosophy of religion, that 
will require encouraging practices that foster such an end.
Calvin College
9Stephen J. Wykstra, “CORNEA, Carnap, and Current Closure Befuddlement,” 
Faith and Philosophy 24 (2007), pp. 87–98. 
10Kevin Corcoran, “Material Persons, Immaterial Souls and an Ethic of Life,” 
Faith and Philosophy 20 (2003), pp. 218–228.
11Del Ratzsch, “Natural Theology, Methodological Naturalism, and ‘Turtles All 
the Way Down,’” Faith and Philosophy 21 (2004), pp. 436–455.
